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Abstract 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) report different empirical findings regarding ownership structure and 
corporate profitability. In this paper, we re-estimate the relation between 
management ownership and firm's value after controlling for the history of 
management ownership as well as inter-firm differences using panel data. Further, 
we consider the possibility that the current ownership structure is jointly determined 
with the firm value, an endogeneity argument a la Demsetz (1983). We find that 
history of the management ownership, not its current level, matters in determining 
the firm value, which is consistent with information asymmetry arguments. 
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1. Introduction 
  
In his path breaking work, Demsetz (1983) argues that a firm's ownership 
structure is endogenously determined to maximize its shareholders' interest. 
Accordingly, Demsetz concludes that there is no relation between ownership structure 
and profitability. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) present evidences supporting Demsetz's 
arguments. They regress accounting profit rates of 511 U.S. companies in 1980 on 
different measures of ownership concentration and they find no significant coefficient. 
  
In contrast, two subsequent papers, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), report quite different findings. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny estimate a piece-wise linear regression in which the dependent variable is 
Tobin's Q and the primary independent variable is the fraction of shares owned by 
corporate management. Using a cross-section sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms for 1980, 
they find that Q first rises as management ownership increases to 5%, then falls as 
ownership increases to 25%, and then rises slightly at higher ownership levels. When 
they use profit rates as an alternative dependent variable they find similar piece-wise 
linear relationship, even though the statistical significance of the estimates is much 
lower. They mention that their results appear at odds with the findings of Demsetz and 
Lehn. They suggest that Demsetz and Lehn fail to capture the non-monotonic 
relationship that they have found by estimating a mis-specified linear model rather than 
a piece-wise linear model. 
  
 McConnell and Servaes (1990) investigate the cross-sectional relation between 
Tobin's Q and management equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms in 1976 and 
for a sample of 1,093 firms in 1986 that are listed on either the New York Stock 
Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. For both samples, they find a significant 
curvilinear relation between Tobin’s Q and the management ownership. Q first 
increases, then decreases, as the shares become concentrated in the hands of managers 
and members of the board of directors. They also mention that their results are 
consistent with neither Demsetz’s (1983) theoretical arguments nor Demsetz and Lehn’s 
(1985) empirical findings. They do not offer any possible theoretical or empirical 
explanation for the inconsistency, though. 
 
 These three empirical results are mutually contradictory. How could these 
conflicting results coexist side by side? In this paper, we re-investigate the relation 
between management ownership and firm's value using panel data rather than cross-
sectional data. The advantage of using panel data is that we are able to control for 
unobservable firm-specific attributes and past history of insider ownership changes to 
better single out the relationship between insider ownership and the firm value.  
 
According to Demsetz, insider ownership is endogenously determined to 
maximize the firm value given firm-specific characteristics. If so, controlling for 
unobservable firm-specific effects and for ownership patterns in the past as well for the 
observable characteristics, would mitigate the endogeneity problem of the current 
ownership variable in determining the firm value. Also, by using panel data, we even 
allow for the possibility that the ownership variable is still endogenous. Accounting for 
endogeneity is easier in the panel data setting than in the cross-sectional data. 
       
 Note that all three of the previous studies use cross-sectional data. Cross-
sectional studies would make any sense at all only when the management shareholding 
is stable over time. Seyhun (1992) reports that in spite of the increased statutory 
sanctions of the 1980s on the insider trading, data show increases in volume and 
abnormal profits of insider trading over time. The management shareholding is not 
stable over time. Unlike cross-sectional data, panel data allows one to take into account 
the effect on the firm value of the history of management ownership changes. 
 
 We argue that the extent of insider trading and the changing pattern of 
management ownership have to be controlled to single out the relation between 
management ownership and the firm value. Under information asymmetry between the 
management and the outside investors, intensive insider trading raises the possibility 
that the informed management exploits the uninformed outside investors. When we 
include a variable measuring the extent of insider trading in the regression, we expect 
its coefficient to be negative as a result. Outside investors take changes in the 
management ownership between the previous year and the current year, as a credible 
signal about the firm's future performance. When we include the change in the 
management ownership in the regression, we expect its coefficient to be positive. 
 
 The above arguments imply that firms with identical management shareholding 
at a specific time can display quite different corporate values. For example, consider 
two firms with the same level of management shareholding. If one firm's management 
reduces its shareholding recently, the firm's market value would be lower than that of 
the other firm that has stable management shareholding. Without controlling for the 
history of management shareholdings, we face difficulties in identifying relation 
between management shareholding and firm's value. Cross-sectional analyses do not 
account for the history of management shareholdings. Empirical findings in cross-
sectional studies much depend on the specific sample being used. We argue that this 
partly explains why the afore-mentioned previous studies report mutually conflicting 
results. 
  
 Another advantage of using panel data lies in that one can better control for 
unobservable inter-firm differences. Many of the firm characteristics are not observed, 
but still important. Another possible explanation for differences among afore-mentioned 
empirical results is that there may be unidentified, but important, inter-firm differences. 
Panel data allow us to better control for unobserved inter-firm differences, enabling us 
to better single out the relation between management ownership and firm's value. 
  
 Panel data analyses of this paper, by being able to control for unobservable 
inter-firm differences and history of management ownership, are expected to better 
reveal the relationship between management ownership and the firm value. In this way, 
we hope to see whose theory, Demsetz's or the others', is more appropriate. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the relation between the management ownership and the firm value. 
Section 3 draws testable hypotheses. Section 4 explains the data and presents the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Ownership structure and corporate value 
  
Berle and Means (1932) point out that potential conflicts of interest arise 
between corporate managers and dispersed shareholders when managers do not have an 
ownership interest in the firm. After Berle and Means' seminal paper, various aspects of 
this so-called agency problem have been analyzed. Among others, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) formalize the relation between managerial equity ownership and the corporate 
value. They divide stockholders into two groups, inside shareholders who manage the 
firm and outside shareholders who do not. Both classes of shareholders are entitled to 
the same dividends per share. The inside shareholders, however, are able to augment 
their cash flows by additionally consuming non-marketable perquisites. In this 
framework, there is an incentive for the manager to adopt investment and financing 
policies that benefit him, but cost the outside stockholders. Thus, the firm value depends 
on the fraction of shares owned by the management. The greater the management share, 
the greater the firm value. 
 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) point out offsetting costs of significant management 
ownership. When a manager only owns a smaller stake, he is disciplined toward firm 
value maximization by the market forces such as the managerial labor market (Fama 
1980), the product market (Hart 1983), and the corporate control market (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983; Stulz 1988). In contrast, when a manager controls a substantial fraction 
of the firm's equity, he can entrench himself from these market disciplines. With 
effective control, the manager may indulge in non-value-maximizing behaviors such as 
high salary and empire building. This entrenchment possibility predicts that corporate 
assets become less valuable when the management holds a significant portion of shares. 
 
 What Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
try to accomplish is to document how these two offsetting forces are realized in real 
firms using cross-section data. Morck et al. write on this point as follows:  
 
"Theoretical arguments alone cannot unambiguously predict the 
relationship between management ownership and market valuation of 
the firm's assets. While the convergence-of-interest hypothesis suggests 
a uniformly positive relationship, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests 
that market valuation can be adversely affected for some range of high 
ownership stakes." 
 
Morck et al. point out that it is not possible, a priori, to predict which force will 
dominate at any level of managerial ownership. Thus, they argue that the relation 
between ownership structure and corporate value is an empirical issue. 
 
 Demsetz (1983) argues that the ownership structure of a firm is an endogenous 
outcome of competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages 
are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium organization of the firm. He writes as follows: 
  
"One cannot simply assert that diffuse ownership fails to yield maximum 
profit or maximum value of the firm. A decision by shareholders to alter 
the ownership structure of their firm from concentrated to diffuse should 
be a decision made in awareness of its consequences for loosening 
control over professional management. The higher cost and reduced 
profit that would be associated with this loosening in ownership control 
should be offset by lower capital acquisition cost or other profit-
enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership if shareholders choose to 
broaden ownership." 
 
Accordingly, he concludes that ownership concentration and profit rate should be 
unrelated. 
 
 As mentioned above, Demsetz and the others suggest quite different 
implications about the relation between management ownership and firm's performance. 
Demsetz argues that there should not be any significant relation between management 
ownership and firm's performance with a few possible exceptions that we would 
mention below. In contrast, the others argue that theory itself cannot tell much about the 
specific relation between management ownership and firm's value. They say it is rather 
an empirical issue. 
 
 How could Demsetz and the others suggest quite different implications? We 
think the fundamental source of difference lies in the way of interpreting management 
perquisite consumption. Morck et al. seem to think that management can indulge in 
non-marketable perquisite consumption at the expense of outside shareholders. There 
are two countervailing forces in this regard. On one hand, as the management 
ownership increases, the management itself bears the greater portion of the cost of 
perquisite consumption, which will enhance self-discipline on perquisite consumption. 
On the other hand, as the management ownership increases, the management effectively 
protects himself from market discipline on perquisite consumption, which will reduce 
external discipline on perquisite consumption. There exists a trade-off between self-
discipline and external discipline as the management ownership changes. As they point 
out, their theory does not tell us anything about whether management's optimal 
perquisite consumption increases or decreases as the management ownership changes. It 
is to be found empirically. 
 
 In addition, the management ownership level is exogenous in their theory. 
Determinants of management ownership are beyond their theory. Why does the 
management of some firms possess large ownership share, whereas the management of 
others does not? If there exists an optimal level of the management ownership most 
appropriate to maximize the perquisite consumption, why does the management not try 
to adjust its ownership to the optimal level? Their theory does not address these 
questions. 
 
 According to Demsetz, there is no free lunch. If there exists a possibility for 
management to indulge in excessive perquisite consumption at the cost of outside 
shareholders, rational investors would take into account this possibility and try to make 
management bear the full cost of expected perquisite consumption at the time they 
invest in the firm. The resulting outcome is desirable for neither the management nor 
the outside investors. Both management and outside investors would be better off if 
they find some mechanisms to reduce perquisite consumption. To Demsetz, increasing 
management ownership is a way of reducing this agency problem through the 
management's self commitment not to indulge in excessive perquisite consumption, and 
therefore it is not right to say that increase in management ownership causes higher 
agency cost through effective entrenchment. 
 
 Rather, in Demsetz's theory, the cost of increasing management ownership arises 
from a different source. To increase management ownership, the management should 
invest a larger portion of its wealth in the firm he manages. This means that the 
management should take higher firm-specific risks and forgo benefits of diversification. 
To induce increased management ownership, the firm or the investors as a whole should 
compensate the management for bearing these higher risks, or for sacrificing 
diversification. This compensation will raise capital cost of the firm. Also, given the 
size of the management wealth, maintaining a high level of management ownership 
restricts the firm size and thus economies of scale in production. There exists a trade-off 
between agency cost on one side, and capital cost and production cost on the other. In 
the process of firm's value maximization considering these trade-offs, shareholders as a 
whole (including the management) determine the general ownership structure and the 
management ownership. In Demsetz's firms, management ownership level is determined 
endogenously together with other factors affecting the firm performance, leading to lack 
of any significant relation between the management ownership and the firm value. 
 
 In his recent book, Demsetz (1995, pp. 66-72) recognizes that there might be 
one possible exception to this prediction on the relation between ownership structure 
and firm's performance. Demsetz suggests that if the management indulges in amenity 
consumption and he has sufficient wealth to persist in amenity consumption, the 
recorded performance and market value of the firm can be depressed in equilibrium. 
Here, amenity is defined as the way firm's assets are used and the nature of the product 
the firm produces. Demsetz write as follows: 
 
"An individual who owns a newspaper might derive utility from 
influencing the political tastes of readers. Catering to this preference 
may come at the expense of profit, for readers might not relish continued 
exposure to the owner's political philosophy in the news and 
editorializing given to them, and it certainly will alter the content of the 
newspaper as compared to one designed simply to maximize profit." 
 
In this case, the management would rather continue amenity consumption even though 
he should fully pay for it in the form of low profit and low market valuation of his firm. 
This is more likely to be sustained in those firms where the incumbent management 
holds large enough shares to secure control over the firm from corporate control market. 
If this kind of amenity consumption is a dominant motive for the management to hold 
large, sometimes majority, shares, we expect to see low performance in those firms with 
large management ownership. 
 
 We suggest another channel through which the management ownership affects 
the firm value. Investors, ex ante, can ask full payment for the expected management 
perquisite consumption. Management may indulge in more perquisite consumption ex 
post than expected ex ante at the cost of outside shareholders. The occurrence of this 
event will lower firm's performance than implicitly contracted for. There exists a 
possible remedy for this. Takeover is that. Takeover can eliminate excessive ex post 
perquisite consumption. Accordingly, we expect to run into management indulging in 
excessive ex post perquisite consumption more frequently in firms where the 
management owns a large enough share and thus the takeover threats do not work. This 
conjecture leads to the empirical implication that there will be negative relation between 
management ownership and the firm performance. 
 
 As a measure of firm's performance, Morck et al. and McConnell et al. use 
Tobin's Q, whereas Demsetz and Lehn use profit rate. Does it matter whether one uses 
firm's market value or profit rate as a measure of firm's performance? 
 
 Firm's market value reflects future profitability of the firm as well as current 
profit. On top of these, as market micro structure theory suggests, the market value 
might be affected by the extent of information asymmetry, frequency or volume of 
insider trading, and liquidity whereas profit stream is quite immune to these elements. 
As a result, the recorded rate of return may differ across investors and securities being 
traded. For example, if there exists a significant difference in liquidity between two 
equities, the less liquid equity should offer a higher recorded return enough to offset 
reduction in liquidity to induce investors to buy the equity. 
 
 Regarding this, Demsetz (1986) suggests quite an intuitive interpretation for 
insider trading and its effects on recorded rate of return. Demsetz asks whether insider 
trading is a way of compensation to management for bearing a higher firm-specific risk, 
and whether investors take into account the possibility of exposure to insider trading 
when they trade equity of the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that firms with high 
firm-specific risks tend to have more concentrated ownership structure. Demsetz (1986) 
reports that there exists a positive correlation between the degree of insider trading and 
the firm-specific risk, and a negative correlation between the degree of insider trading 
and the recorded market rates of return. Demsetz interprets this empirical result as an 
indirect evidence supporting that insider trading is a way of compensation to controlling 
shareholders for taking a high firm-specific risk, and that investors discount stocks 
being actively traded by insiders.  
 
 If investors ask price discount for the equities insiders are intensively trading, 
and if insider trading is one way of compensation to management for bearing a higher 
firm-specific risk, then increasing management ownership will depress market price of 
equity of the firm in equilibrium. From this, we can expect a negative relation between 
the management ownership and the firm's market value even when there is no 
significant relation between the management ownership and the firm's performance in 
terms of profit rate. We expect to see that the relation between the firm value and the 
management ownership would be relatively more negative in the case of using market 
value as the dependent variable than in the case of using profit rate as the dependent 
variable. 
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
 In this paper, we investigate the relation between the management ownership 
and the firm value after controlling for unidentified inter-firm differences and the 
history of management ownership changes using panel data. Management is defined as 
officers and directors as usual. 
 
 First, we consider the history of management ownership of a firm as an 
important factor that can possibly affect the firm's market value. More specifically, we 
test a hypothesis that firm's market value be negatively affected by the extent of 
management's insider trading. We also test another hypothesis that firms market value 
be positively affected by an increase in management ownership, which is measured by 
the difference of management shareholding between the current year and the previous 
year. 
 
 Under asymmetric information between management and outsiders, a firm 
experiencing intensive insider trading would incur higher implicit transaction cost to 
uninformed outsiders. This perception would lead outsider investors to ask price 
discount when they buy such a firm's equity. Also, the direction and amount of change 
in management shareholding between two consecutive years can be interpreted as the 
existence of insider's private information about the future profitability of the firm. When 
the management shareholding increases, it would have positive effect on the firm's 
market value because uninformed outsiders would interpret it as the existence of high 
profit opportunity in the future. With this perception, outsider investors would be 
willing to pay premium when they buy such a firm's equity. 
 
4. Data and results 
 
4.1 Data 
 
 In this analysis, price-earnings ratio is regressed against the measures of 
ownership and other control variables. Tobin's Q has been used by many studies 
including Morck et al. and McConnell et al. 
 
 Tobin's Q has some defects to be used as a measure of firm's value. First, the 
process of computing it inevitably entails some arbitrariness. For example, it is hard to 
find objective criteria to compute replacement costs. Second, as Bagnani, Milonas, 
Saunders, and Travlos (1994) point out, market price of risky debt may also be affected 
by management ownership. If this is the case, we should use market price of debt when 
we use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm's market value, which was not the case in 
previous studies. Further, if we use market prices of debt to take into account this point, 
Tobin's Q would not anymore be an appropriate measure of firm's value from 
shareholders' perspectives, rather it is a measure of firm's market value from general 
claim holder's perspective.  
 
Price-earnings ratio does not face these problems. It does not require any 
arbitrary computing process. In price-earnings ratio, earnings can be considered as a 
measure of opportunity cost of shareholders' capital, and price of equity is the right 
measure of firm's market value from shareholders' perspectives. So, in this paper, we 
use price-earnings ratio as a measure of firm value. 
 
 This paper uses data on 11 firms in the chemical industry. For each sample firm, 
we have annual data from 1981 through 1990, resulting in 110 (firm, year) 
combinations. As the data source, we use the Value Line Investment Survey which is 
being widely used in related works. 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
 
 We estimate three panel data models: pooled least squares, fixed effects, and 
random effects models. The pooled least squares treats time-series data of a firm just as 
different firms at a point in time. This method does not utilize information on who's 
who regarding firm identity. The reason why we still report the pooled least squares 
results is twofold. One is that, even though it has the afore-mentioned defect, the pooled 
least squares effectively maximizes the sample size. The other, more important, reason 
is that the pooled least squares is similar to the cross sectional analyses in that it does 
not control for unidentified inter-firm differences even though it controls for the history 
of management ownership. Table 1 shows the results of the pooled least squares, which 
serve as a benchmark for interpreting the panel estimation results in table 2.  
 
In table 1, when we initially regress price-earnings ratio on management 
ownership share, we obtain a negative linear relation between management 
shareholding and price-earnings ratio. When we include the variance of or the change in 
management shareholding as a proxy for insider trading, the proxy variable turns out 
significant, whereas the management shareholding itself loses statistical significance. 
Column 5 shows that the coefficient of the variance of management shareholding is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level, whereas the coefficient of 
the level of management shareholding is insignificant even at 10% level. Column 6 
shows that the coefficient of the change in management ownership is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, whereas the level of management ownership is 
insignificant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Results from the pooled least squares 
 
Pooled least squares regression of price-earnings ratio on equity ownership, variance of management shareholding, 
change in management shareholding, dividend per share, debt ratio, expected growth rate of earnings per share, and 
variance of earnings per share. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 15.42**  (44.92) 
15.44** 
(37.03) 
15.14** 
(36.20) 
15.67** 
(32.84) 
14.78** 
(17.84) 
15.80** 
(18.31) 
Insider -0.06** (-5.27) 
-0.68 
(-1.34)   
0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.03 
(-1.20) 
insider^2  0.00 (0.15) -    
insider+block   -0.04* (-2.22) 
-0.15** 
(-2.79) -  
(insider+block)^2    0.003* (2.41) -  
var(insider)     -0.04** (-3.45)  
change(insider)      0.13** (2.92) 
Dividend     3.03** (3.43) 
1.00 
(1.48) 
Debt     -3.86** (-2.67) 
-5.43** 
(-3.46) 
r_E/S     3.19** (4.05) 
2.70** 
(3.22) 
var(E/S)     -2.15** (-3.08) 
-0.95 
(-1.55) 
 
1. Within parentheses are t-values. 
2. Variables are defined as follows.  
  (a) insider: fraction of management share (%),   
  (b) insider+block: sum of management share and outside block holder share (%), 
  (c) var(insider): variance of “insider” over time, 
  (d) change(insider): change in “insider” between the previous year and the current year, 
  (e) dividend: dividend per share, 
  (f) debt: debt ratio, 
  (g) r_E/S: expected growth rate of earnings per share, 
  (h) var(E/S): variance of earnings per share over time. 
3. **, *, and # denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results from the fixed effects and the random effects models 
 
Regression of price-earnings ratio on equity ownership, variance of management shareholding, change in 
management shareholding, dividend per share, debt ratio, expected growth rate of earnings per share, and variance of 
earnings per share.  
 
fixed effect model random effect model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
intercept - - 14.86** (13.01) 
16.69** 
(16.62) 
insider -0.09 (-1.61) 
-0.13* 
(-2.33) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(-1.09) 
var(insider) -0.17 (-2.06E-15)  
-0.06** 
(-3.01)  
change(insider)  0.13* (2.17)  
0.18* 
(2.21) 
dividend 1.40 (1.69) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
3.23** 
(2.80) 
0.78 
(0.87) 
debt -0.26 (-0.15) 
-0.45 
(-0.27) 
-4.07* 
(-2.07) 
-8.47 ** 
(-4.74) 
r_E/S 3.55 ** (4.85) 
3.56** 
(4.84) 
3.73** 
(4.43) 
3.31** 
(3.51) 
var(E/S) 15.37 (9.77E-16) 
13.04 
(8.23E-16) 
-2.08# 
(-1.81) 
-1.1 
(-1.25) 
 
1. Within parentheses are t-values. 
2. Variables are defined as follows.  
  (a) insider: fraction of management share (%),   
  (b) insider+block: sum of management share and outside block holder share (%), 
  (c) var(insider): variance of “insider” over time, 
  (d) change(insider): change in “insider” between the previous year and the current year, 
  (e) dividend: dividend per share, 
  (f) debt: debt ratio, 
  (g) r_E/S: expected growth rate of earnings per share, 
  (h) var(E/S): variance of earnings per share over time. 
3. **, *, and # denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among other results are that high debt ratio and volatility in earnings per share 
have negative impact on firm's market value, whereas high dividend payment and high 
expected growth of earnings have positive effects.  
  
In table 2, we report the estimation results from fixed effects and random effects 
models. There are trade-offs between the two panel data models. The fixed effects 
model better controls for unobserved inter-firm differences and better addresses the 
potential endogeneity problem of the management ownership variable, whereas the 
random effect model is more parsimonious in terms of the parameters being estimated. 
Alternatively speaking, the fixed effects model loses too many degrees of freedom, 
whereas the random effects model does not address the potential endogeneity of the 
management ownership variable and only partially controls for the unobserved inter-
firm differences.  
 
The results in table 2 again suggest that management ownership history matters 
and that once the variance of or change in management ownership is controlled the 
management shareholding itself does not have any significant effect on the firm value. 
Most results agree with the corresponding results in Table 1. Statistical significance 
drops though in Table 2, particularly so in the case of fixed effect models. 
 
Even with limited data, it is suggestive that the history of management 
shareholding be crucial in determining the firm value. First, market participants ask a 
discount when they trade equities of a firm of which the management is actively 
involved in trading. Second, market participants are willing to pay premium to buy 
equities of a firm of which the management recently increases its shareholding. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 This paper revisits the issue of analyzing the relation between the insider 
ownership share and the firm value. Under information asymmetry between the inside 
management and the outside investors, history of the management ownership affects a 
firm’s value in the following two ways. First, an active insider trading poses the 
possibility of outsider exploitation by the inside management, depressing the firm value. 
Second, insider’s buying of shares signals positive news on the firm’s value in a 
credible way, increasing the firm value. 
 
      Previous cross-sectional studies do not take into account of the management 
ownership history, resulting in specification errors and biased estimates. This paper, by 
using panel data of firms in a single industry, shows that the management ownership 
history indeed matters in determining the firm value as predicted by the information 
asymmetry arguments. This paper also shows that once the management ownership 
history is controlled, the level itself of the management ownership is no longer 
statistically significant. 
 
At the current stage, we think that the sample size is rather small. Therefore, we 
do not want to over-sell the empirical results obtained in this paper. Rather, we would 
like to point out that our hypotheses deserve further empirical investigation. A more in 
depth study will be reported in a near future. 
 
With a bigger data set in the future, we are planning to address the following 
issues. First, we test endogeneity of the management ownership variable using Hausman 
and Taylor's (1981) IV/GLS techniques. Second, we allow for a non-linear relationship 
between the management ownership and the firm value by specifying a flexible linear 
spline function of the management ownership variable. 
 
Third, we measure the firm value using both market value and profit rate, and 
see whether the relation between the firm value and the management ownership would 
be relatively more negative in the case of using the market value as the dependent 
variable than in the case of using the profit rate as the dependent variable. More 
specifically, we test the hypothesis that between management ownership and profit rate 
there be no significant relation or slightly negative relation in the range of high 
management ownership level, and the hypothesis that there be negative relation between 
management ownership and firm's market value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Bagnani, E., T. Nikolaos, A. Saunders, and N. Travlos (1994), “Managers, owners, and 
the pricing of risky debt: an empirical analysis,” Journal of Finance, June 1994, 453-477. 
 
Berle, A. Jr., and G. Means (1932), The modern corporation and private property, New 
York: Macmillan. 
 
Demsetz, H. (1983), “The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm,” Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26, 375-390. 
 
Demsetz, H. (1995), The Economics of the Business Firm, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn (1985), “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
 
Fama, E. (1980), “Agency problems and the theory of the firm,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288-307. 
 
Fama, E., and M. Jensen (1983), “Separation of ownership control,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
 
Hart, O. (1983), “The market mechanism as an incentive scheme,” Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14, 366-382. 
 
Hausman, J., and W. Taylor (1981), “Panel data and unobservable individual effects,” 
Econometrica, 49, 1377-1398. 
 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the firm: Management behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
 
Jensen, M., and R. Ruback (1983), “The market for corporate control: The scientific 
evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50. 
 
McConnell, J., and H. Servaes (1990), “Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612. 
 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1988), “Management ownership and market 
valuation,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
 
Seyhun, H. (1992), “The effectiveness of the insider-trading sanctions,” Journal of Law 
and Economics, 35, 149-182. 
 
Stulz, R. (1988), “Managerial control of voting rights, financing policies and the market 
for corporate control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-54. 
